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By 1932, British troops
had been waging war of varying intensity with a group of intractable tribes
along and beyond the northwestern frontier of India for nearly a century. That
year, in summarizing a typical skirmish, one British veteran noted laconically,
“Probably no sign till the burst of ªre, and then the swift rush with knives, the
stripping of the dead, and the unhurried mutilation of the inªdels.”1 It was a
savage, cruel, and peculiar kind of mountain warfare, frequently driven by re-
ligious zealotry on the tribal side, and it was singularly unforgiving of tactical
error, momentary inattention, or cultural ignorance. It still is. The Pakistan-
Afghanistan border region has experienced turbulence for centuries. Today a
portion of it constitutes a signiªcant threat to U.S. national security interests.
The unique underlying factors that create this threat are little understood by
most policymakers in Washington.
This region, which is almost certainly home to both Osama bin Laden
and his lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has once again become a locus for a
regenerating al-Qaida network. The July 2007 National Intelligence Esti-
mate (NIE) on terrorist threats to the United States—an intelligence product
known to analysts as the mildest common denominator everyone can agree
on—corroborates this assessment.2 The NIE states that al-Qaida, with uninter-
rupted funding from radical Saudi Arabian Wahabist sources, not only has
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rebuilt its command structure in the border region, but has continued to re-
cruit and train operatives to inªltrate the United States and other Western
countries.3
The border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is 1,640 miles long, much of it
spanning terrain so remote and so mountainous that it is virtually inaccessible.
For Pakistan, instability extends beyond both endpoints. To the east, the bor-
der with China along “the roof of the world” runs 325 miles and separates
Pakistan from China’s discontented Uighur Muslim minority in Sinkiang
Province, a land once known as the independent Khanate of Kashgaria. Far to
the west, Pakistan shares a 565-mile border with Iran, home on both sides
to restless Baluchis and drug smugglers. Stretched on a map of the United
States, the Pakistan-Afghanistan border would run from New York City to
Santa Fe, New Mexico. Even in ancient times, the vast area that lies along this
border served as both barrier and gateway and was a refuge for insurgents,
smugglers, and bandits.
A portion of this border area continues to be home to a host of militant
groups bent on exporting jihad. Foremost among them is the Taliban. Since
retreating from Afghanistan following the U.S. invasion in October 2001, thou-
sands of Taliban ªghters and virtually the entire intact Taliban senior leader-
ship shura (religious council) have found sanctuary in Pakistan’s Federally
Administered Tribal Area (FATA) at the center of the border, as well as in parts
of the Pakistani province of Baluchistan to the west and the North West Fron-
tier Province (NWFP) to the east and south. These areas coincide almost ex-
actly with the area of Pakistan overwhelmingly dominated by the Pashtun
ethnic group. The Taliban and the other Islamic extremist insurgent elements
operating on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border are almost exclu-
sively Pashtuns, with a sprinkling of radicals from nonborder ethnicities. The
implications of this salient fact—that most of Pakistan’s and Afghanistan’s vio-
lent religious extremism, and with it much of the United States’ counterterror-
ism challenge, are centered within a single ethnolinguistic group—have not
been fully grasped by a governmental policy community that has long down-
played cultural dynamics.
This article explores the reasons why religious and political extremism in the
Pakistan-Afghanistan border region ends neatly at the borders of the Pashtun
lands. It begins with a brief overview of the geography and typography of the
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border, followed by a condensed study of the key ethnographic and cultural
factors. An understanding of the tribal and social framework of the border,
particularly its alternative forms of governance, is critical to the subsequent
discussion of the current instability and radicalization. In addition to religion,
tribal mores that predate Islam shape insurgent behavior and should inform
all aspects of engagement on both sides of the border. The article concludes
with an examination of the history and the unintended consequences of border
politics, and offers policy recommendations to begin to reverse the ongoing
slide into Talibanization.
Geography of the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Region
The Pakistan-Afghanistan border region is a forbidding landscape of towering
mountain ranges, narrow valleys, desert plains, and rocky, barren wasteland
(see Figure 1). The topography alone makes the creation of an identiªable bor-
der nearly impossible. In the south, the border area begins on the tropical ºoor
of the subcontinent and pushes northward into the three great mountain
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Figure 1. The Pakistan-Afghanistan Border and Frontier Area
SOURCE: U.S. Department of State, 2007.
ranges of Central Asia—the Himalaya, Pamir, and Hindu Kush. Part of the
border lies within the monsoon belt of South Asia, but most of the area re-
ceives little rainfall. Nevertheless, some 30 million people still manage to eke a
hard living out of this land.
According to Pakistani ofªcials, two “established” border crossings handle
the bulk of legal daily cross-border trafªc: Torkham, in the north at the end of
the Khyber Pass, and Chaman in the south. Both are manned by ofªcials of the
Pakistani customs service and the Federal Investigative Agency as well as by
Levies.4 Another twenty “frequented” border-crossing routes are manned
by customs ofªcials, Khassadars, and Levies.5 There are also 111 “unfre-
quented” (illegal and known) and unmanned crossings in the north and
229 such crossing areas in the south.6 Unaccounted for in this typology of bor-
der crossings are hundreds of foot and goat paths used by smugglers, locals,
and nomads (i.e., Brahui and Afghan Kuchis),7 who seasonally cross the bor-
der with their herds.8 The vast majority of these crossings are uncharted and
are not monitored by either Islamabad or Kabul.
the northern section of the border
We designate the northern portion of the border as extending from the Pamir
mountain range pass at Mintaka in the Wakhan Corridor to the Gomal River in
Paktika Province on the Afghan side of the border and South Waziristan on the
Pakistani side (see Figure 2).9 This 1,025-kilometer section of the border in-
cludes the northern Hindu Kush region and Afghanistan’s highest peak,
Nowshak (24,557 feet/7,485 meters). The Safed Koh range, southeast of Kabul
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wear uniforms. Khassadars nominally report to the Political Agent for their agency.
6. Senior Pakistani ofªcial, interview by authors, Rawalpindi, Pakistan, March 12, 2007.
7. In Urdu (Pakistan) the Kuchi are known as powindahs. The pastoral Kuchi once numbered an es-
timated 1 million persons. Dependent on migration to summer and winter pastures, they were
decimated by the Soviet-Afghan war and the indiscriminate and unmarked sowing of approxi-
mately 6 million landmines by the Soviet Union at border crossing points. Perhaps 400,000 are
semi- or fully nomadic today, and they remain the world’s largest nomadic group. In recognition
of their numbers and the Kuchis’ place in Afghan society, seventeen seats in the lower house of the
Afghan parliament are reserved for them. They dislike the Taliban intensely.
8. Numerous villages also straddle the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, presenting another dilemma.
Several of these villages, such as Barabchah and Baluchistan, are cut in two by the border. While
the border has always been artiªcial to Pashtuns who regularly transverse it, divided villages offer
a relatively easy venue for crossing illegally into or out of Pakistan or Afghanistan. See Thomas H.
Johnson, “On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan,” China and Eur-
asia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 2 (May 2007), pp. 114–115.
9. The border segmentation presented here corresponds to Pakistani Army Corps areas of opera-
tion, speciªcally, the 11th Corps in the north (headquartered in Peshawar) and the 12th Corps in
the south (headquartered in Quetta).
and west of Peshawar, Pakistan, includes the approach area to the Khyber Pass
with its summit at Landi Kotal near the Afghan border town of Torkham.
The northern portion of the border contains the Afghan provinces of
Badakshan, Khost, Kunar, Nangarhar, Nuristan, Paktia, and Paktika; all seven
agencies of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Area; and a portion of the
NWFP. The FATA runs north to south along this northern section of the border
and forms a Massachusetts-sized wedge between Afghanistan and the NWFP
(see Figure 3). It has a population of 3.2 to 4.0 million people, virtually all of
whom are Pashtuns.10
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10. Perhaps 1,000 ethnic Urmurs, or Ormurs, live in the vicinity of Kaniguram northwest of Dera
Ismail Khan in Waziristan, surrounded by Mahsud Pashtuns. They speak Ormuri, an Indo-Euro-
pean language, which is also spoken by a few families in Baraki-Barak in Logar Province,
Afghanistan.
Figure 2. Northern Portion of Pakistan-Afghanistan Border
SOURCE: Senior Pakistani official, interview by authors, Rawalpindi, Pakistan, March 12,
2007.
the southern section of the border
The 1,200-kilometer-long southern section of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border
stretches from the Gomal River to the Pakistan-Iran border at Robat (see Fig-
ure 4). The major political division on the Pakistan side of this section is the
province of Baluchistan. On the Afghan side, from east to west, are Zabul,
Kandahar, Helmand, and Nimruz Provinces.
Baluchistan, which derives its name from its indigenous Baluch ethnic
group, is Pakistan’s largest yet least populous province. It includes designated
tribal areas in the Kohlu District, home to two of the largest and most intracta-
ble Baluchi tribes—the Bugtis and the Marris. Quetta, the provincial capital, is
the only signiªcant city.
Lying outside the monsoon belt and with few rivers, northern Baluchistan
largely consists of desert basins, arid hills, and low mountains. In premodern
times, this region was known as Registan, the “Land of Sand.”
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Figure 3. Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Area
SOURCE: “Welcome to FATA,” http://www.fata.gov.pk/.
Ethnography of the Border Area
The portion of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region discussed in this article
is home to dozens of ethnic groups and languages. The largest group by far is
made up of the Pashtun tribes that inhabit the center,11 but the region is also
home to Baluchis, Ketranis, Nuristanis, Brahui, Munjis, Chitralis, Shinas,
Gujaris, Hazaras, Kowars, Savis, Tajiks, Hindkos, Dameli, Kalamis, Urmurs,
and Wahkis, as well as to the Gawar-Batis, Badeshi, Khirgiz, and Burushos,
among others—each of whom speaks a distinct language, in some cases with
dozens of mutually unintelligible subdialects. Of all these ethnic groups, how-
ever, only the Pashtuns have ever demonstrated an interest in the type of jihad
being waged by the Taliban.
The vast majority of these groups are Muslims of the Hanaª Sunni tradition.
A tiny minority of Pashtuns are Shiites, principally clustered in the Kurram
river valley in Kurram Agency of the FATA. Virtually all members of the Turi
tribe of the Karlanri Pashtuns in that valley are Shiites, as are some Bangash,
Chamkanni, and Orakzai clans. (Small Pashtun Shiite communities also dot
southern Afghanistan, including two groups in Kandahar Province.) In addi-
tion, there are vestigial pockets of non-Muslim groups in the northern section
of the border, including the Kalash people living on the Durand line in the
northern Chitral. The Nuristani tribes of Nuristan Province in eastern
Afghanistan were among the last peoples in the border region to convert to
Islam, in their case about 100 years ago during the Afghan reign of Abdul
Rahman, dubbed the “Iron Emir.” The Nuristanis still sometimes use animist
gravesite efªgies, which are prohibited in Islam, suggesting that they have
grafted Islamic beliefs onto existing traditional customs. This is also true of the
Pashtuns, where Hanaª Sunni beliefs are layered over a much older social
code.
The southern section of the border is home to three major ethnic groups. Be-
ginning at the Pishin hills and running east to the FATA live Pashtuns of the
Ghurghusht and Karlanri tribes. Quetta lies on an ethnic boundary, roughly
half Baluch and half Pashtun. To the west of Quetta live Baluchis and the
Brahui. The Brahui speak a Dravidian language and were once a major power
in the region of Kalat under the rule of the hereditary khan of Kalat.12 Today
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11. Militants located in the Pashtun-majority regions of Pakistan are closely tied to the Pashtun re-
gions of eastern and southern Afghanistan.
12. Kalat brieºy asserted independence from Pakistan in 1948. The British signed a treaty with the
khan of Kalat in 1854, which made the khanate nominally subordinate to the Indian government,
but the British maintained control over this region only after granting substantial autonomy to the
khan.
they consist of sedentary, semi- and fully nomadic clans that are slowly assimi-
lating into the cultures around them. They are a peaceful pastoral people who
have subsisted for centuries in a harsh environment by raising the herding of
sheep to a science. The Brahui have shown no interest in the Taliban or its
creed.
the baluchis
The Baluchis are the dominant force from Quetta to the Iranian border.13 Like
the Pashtuns, Baluchis have a distinct cultural identity and have traditionally
resisted internal meddling. Many of their social values are similar to those of
the neighboring Pashtun. Unlike the acephalous Pashtun, however, the Baluchi
clans recognize chiefs, called sardars, and invest them with leadership author-
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13. The Baluch, like the Pashtun, are predominantly Sunni, with most belonging to the Haniª
School of Islamic jurisprudence.
Figure 4. Southern Portion of Pakistan-Afghanistan Border
SOURCE: Senior Pakistani official, interview by authors, Rawalpindi, Pakistan, March 12,
2007.
ity. Although the position is hereditary, a sardar must consistently demonstrate
wise, strong, and just leadership; a sardar who fails to do so may forfeit his po-
sition. The Baluchis revolted against the Pakistani government in 1973, when,
shortly after the discovery of major natural gas and mineral reserves under-
neath their land, Islamabad revoked the authority of the sardars to administer
their own peoples and moved to take control of their lands. Over the next ªve
years, the Pakistani government deployed nearly six full divisions to suppress
an estimated 55,000 Baluchi ªghters. Selig Harrison documented the extensive
use of napalm against Baluchi villages during this period.14 By the time the
ªghting ended in 1978, at least 5,000 Baluchi ªghters and 3,000 Pakistani Army
personnel were dead, in addition to uncounted thousands of Baluchi noncom-
batants. Since then, insurgency has ºared up repeatedly, with guerrillas target-
ing oil pipelines and security personnel. A low-level insurgency continues in
2008 with sporadic attacks on Pakistani government targets.
In the colonial period, the British did not attempt to disrupt the sardari cul-
ture. To the contrary, the region became practically synonymous with Robert
Sandeman, a brilliant but mercurial administrator whose methods of working
within the Baluchi culture were so successful they became known as the
Sandeman system. As historian David Gilmour described it, “The Sandeman
system seemed simple. You made friends with the tribes, you dealt with them
through their chiefs, you paid tribesmen to patrol your communications, you
adhered to tribal custom and settled disputes by jirgas and not through law
courts. You tried to solve all problems peacefully but you kept an effective mil-
itary force ready and visible; and from time to time you extended your control
by the construction of roads and forts.”15 Sandeman’s system worked well,
and the Baluchis remained testy but not insurgent. In fact, the British enlisted
many Baluchis into native regiments. Curiously, so too did the Sultanate of
Oman, which governed parts of Baluchistan prior to Indian independence and
partition, and which still has an agreement with Pakistan to recruit Baluchis in
Baluchistan for Oman’s army. (At the time of Oman’s independence in 1970,
virtually the entire army was composed of Baluchis.16)
The goals of the Baluchi insurgency remain greater autonomy, reinstatement
of the Baluchis’ tribal land rights and the authority of the sardars, and the dis-
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tribution of resources in Baluchistan to the Baluchis. The Baluchis’ grievances
are not without merit; few of the Pakistani government’s rural development
projects funded with the revenues from the province’s natural resources have
reached the Baluchi people. In contrast to its policy toward the Taliban, how-
ever, the Pakistani government has pursued a course of massive military sup-
pression of the Baluchi insurgency since 1973.
the pashtuns
Although there is some dispute about the origins of the Pashtun ethnic group,
anthropologists generally agree that the tribes that make up this group ªrst
moved into the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region about 1,000 years ago,
from the area around Ghor. According to tradition, members of the Pashtun
Hill Tribes who inhabit the FATA are descendents of Karlan, a foundling
adopted as the fourth son of Qais Abdur Rashid, a contemporary of the
Prophet Mohammed and the ur-ancestor of the Pashtun ethnic group. The Hill
Tribes, or Karlanri, include many of the most warlike tribes, such as the
Afridis, Daurs, Jadrans, Ketrans, Mahsuds, Mohmands, and Waziris. Of all
the Pashtun tribes, the Waziris of greater Waziristan (a region that includes
North Waziristan Agency, South Waziristan Agency, and the Bermol District of
Afghanistan’s Paktika Province) are reputed to be the most conservative and
irascible. The Waziris pride themselves on never having paid taxes to any sov-
ereign and never having their lands, which they consider veiled, or in purdah,
conquered.17 (Considered good but unreliable ªghters by the British during
the colonial era, the Waziris and several other tribes were prohibited de facto
from enlisting in native regiments of the Indian Army.)
Historically, the rural Pashtuns have dominated their neighbors and have
avoided subjugation or integration by a larger nation. As one elderly Pashtun
tribesman told Mountstuart Elphinstone, a British ofªcial visiting Afghanistan
in 1809, “We are content with discord, we are content with alarms, we are con-
tent with blood . . . we will never be content with a master.”18 This characteris-
tic makes Pashtuns the perfect insurgents.
With more than 25 million members, the Pashtun represent one of the largest
tribal groups in the world.19 They are not, however, homogeneous, and deter-
mining who is a Pashtun is often a matter of contention. There are, for exam-
ple, tribes that are ethnically Pashtun but that pretend not to be and speak
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Dari; other tribes that are not of Pashtun descent claim to be and speak Pashto.
All Pashtuns, however, profess descent from the eponymous Qais. Entire vol-
umes have been written to explore this claim, and the issue of Pashtun geneal-
ogy remains contentious. What is important for policymakers is that this
descent is an article of faith in the Pashtun narrative.
As an ethnicity, the Pashtuns, who are also called Pahktuns, Pushtoons,
Afghans, and occasionally Pathans in Pakistan and India, may be loosely clus-
tered into ªve major groupings: the Durrani tribes, the Ghilzai (or Ghalji)
tribes, the Sarbani or Eastern tribes, the Ghurghusht tribes, and the Karlanri
(or Karlani), sometimes referred to as the Hill Tribes. Experts suggest there are
about 350 major tribes in these ªve general groupings.20 Relationships between
them dating back hundreds of years are complex and complicated by feuds,
disputes, ancient alliances, and political marriages. The best documented of
the many fault lines running through Pashtun society is the 300-year-old
conºict between the Durrani and Ghilzai tribes in Afghanistan, a conºict that
forms one of the underlying reasons for the struggle between the Taliban and
the government of Hamid Karzai.21
The Pashtun are perhaps the most highly segmentary ethnic group in the
world. Each of the approximately 350 tribes has a large number of clans, or
khels, descending from it. (Some khels, such as the Suleiman Khel of the
Ghilzais, are so large that they have an additional layer of sub-khels.) The khels
in turn are divided into large extended family groups called kahols. Depending
on their size, a varying number of nuclear families, or koranays, make up the
kahol.22 All Pashtuns speak Pashto, or its harsher dialect of Pahkto. Both Pashto
and Pahkto have many regional dialects; communication difªculties are not
unknown between them.
Pashtuns identify themselves in terms of their familial ties and commit-
ments, and have a fundamentally different way of looking at the world. As the
preeminent Afghan scholar M. Jamil Haniª wrote in 1978: “The Afghan indi-
vidual is surrounded . . . by concentric rings consisting of family, extended
family, clan, tribe, confederacy, and major cultural-linguistic group. The hierar-
chy of loyalties corresponds to these circles and becomes more intense as the
circle gets smaller . . . seldom does an Afghan, regardless of cultural back-
ground, need the services and/or the facilities of the national government.
Thus, in case of crisis, his recourse is to the kinship and, if necessary, the larger
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Afghanistan,” Orbis, Vol. 51, No. 1 (January 2007), pp. 71–89.
22. For a breakdown of the tribal division within the Pashtun ethnic group, see Caroe, The Pathans.
cultural group. National feelings and loyalties are ªltered through the succes-
sive layers.”23
Pashtuns engage in social, political, and economic activities within these
concentric rings; this engagement prevents government-oriented institutions
from gaining a foothold in tribal areas.24 This segmentation is one reason why,
historically, no foreign entity—whether Alexander, the British, the Soviets, the
Afghans, or the Pakistanis—has been able to reconcile the Pashtun to external
rule.25 During the nineteenth century, at the height of its imperial power, Great
Britain struggled and failed to subject the Pashtuns to state authority.26
Even the most brutal of these foreign incursions, the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan in the 1980s, failed to subjugate the Pashtuns—despite genocidal
military tactics and a massive commitment of military personnel and ªre-
power that killed more than a million Pashtuns and drove at least 3 million
more into exile in Pakistan and Iran.27
For centuries this frontier has fascinated Western observers, beginning with
British East India Company ofªcials who began to explore the region in the
late eighteenth century. They were followed by generations of Victorian ex-
plorers, administrators, and soldiers who, unable to penetrate and subdue it,
instead wove a complex mythology around its people. But a review of the lit-
erature and historiography of the region shows a pervasive British bias toward
depictions of the Pashtun border tribes as warlike, brave, and stoic—worthy
adversaries for generations of Victorians, as Mukulika Banerjee pointed out.28
A century of British fascination and amateur anthropology, which spawned
such romantic theories as the native Pashtun peoples being descendents of the
lost tribes of Israel, and which reached their peak in Rudyard Kipling’s cele-
brated novel Kim, has obscured a more complex if less romantic social reality.
The obstinacy of the Pashtun tribes and the inability of the British Empire to
control them led to a border policy of “masterly inactivity” that essentially
used the tribesmen as a buffer between India’s northern frontier and the ap-
proaching Russian Empire in Central Asia. Successive Pakistani and Afghan
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governments were no more successful than the British or the Russians, and the
designation of this region as a kind of tribal no man’s land over generations
created the loose political system of tribal autonomy in the FATA seen today.29
Indeed the name for this area is actually a misnomer. It is not federally admin-
istered in any sense of the word.30 Constitutionally, Islamabad has never main-
tained legal jurisdiction over more than 100 meters to the left and right of the
few paved roads in the tribal areas.
Insurgency and Pashtun Tribal Structures in History
The Taliban is neither unique nor a new phenomenon to the Pashtun border
area. Historically, many jihadi groups and charismatic religious leaders similar
to the Taliban have arisen from this area at generational intervals to challenge
governments on both sides of the border. For example, a ªgure remarkably
similar to Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar, Mirza Ali Khan—a Tori
Khel Waziri Pashtun known to the West as the Fakir of Ipi—led British and
later Pakistani security forces on a frustrating chase around the frontier for
thirty years.31 Protected by his Pashtun tribal supporters in the mountains,
he was never caught. Another charismatic religious leader, the Mullah of
Hadda, provoked the Great Pashtun Revolt of 1897 through a combination
of mysticism, parlor tricks, and promises to turn British bullets to water.32 The
“Hindustani Fanatics” movement troubled the British for decades. There were
so many apparently spontaneous jihads led by illiterate charismatic mullahs
that the British frontier administrators of the Victorian era dubbed them “mad
mullah movements.” The current manifestation of this phenomenon, however,
did not arise spontaneously, but was deliberately encouraged by the Pakistani
government.
This radical Pakistani policy of playing with ªre began with the subversion
of Pashtun tribal structures in the early 1970s and accelerated dramatically af-
ter the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. After the extremists took over
political control of a district, the system of elders meetings and jirgas would be
replaced with conservative politico-religious leadership cells comprising local
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mullahs known as “ulemas.”33 Because of the length of the Taliban regime’s
tenure in Afghanistan and its (nonregime) insurgent durability since the start
of Operation Enduring Freedom, the Taliban has been more successful than
most previous jihadi movements in the region in consolidating and embed-
ding these social changes. Therein lies the danger, because with the exception
of the Hindustan Fanatics group of the mid-nineteenth century, most such
mad mullah movements of the past have been of such relatively short duration
or limited territorial scope that they made little lasting impact on tribal struc-
tures and mechanisms.
This susceptibility of the people of the region to such religious insurgencies,
and their resistance to external governmental control, have been ascribed by
some observers to tribal culture, or simply a response to chronic poverty and
underdevelopment.34 Yet all of the ethnic groups of the border region have in
common the same key elements of segmentary, patrilineal tribal organization,
and the same endemic poverty, so tribalism and tribal social structure alone
cannot account for this insurgent behavior.
Another of the most frequent and more facile observations applied by
Western intelligence analysts to this region is that these areas are “ungov-
erned.” Indeed, this observation has helped to create the central pillar of the
international effort in Afghanistan since 2001, which is to “extend the reach of
the central government” into these areas.35 This is a dangerous and fundamen-
tally bankrupt approach, however, arrived at by misguided bureaucrats, pol-
icy analysts, and Westernized Afghan elites, who are the ªrst to downplay the
importance of tribalism and the Pashtun tribal code known as Pashtunwali.
Indeed, the misleading assurances of such elites, often the only contacts of
Western policy professionals, have been instrumental in drawing critical un-
derstanding away from tribal realities. The prescription of extending the reach
of the central government is, in fact, precisely the wrong answer to apply to a
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highly developed culture in which “central government” is anathema and re-
action to it is insurgency: the fact that the insurgency in Afghanistan has
grown steadily in intensity, lethality, and amount of territory under Taliban
control every year since this policy was enshrined is not a coincidence.
The absence of Western state structures of governance in large swathes of
the tribal areas should not be conºated, as the policy described above does,
with the absence of governance. Complex and sophisticated conºict-resolution
mechanisms, legal codes, and alternative forms of governance have developed
in the region over a millennia. Moreover, the rural Pashtuns prefer their own
mechanisms to alien, external ones because, in their perceptions, theirs are
clearly superior. Depictions of the frontier as a lawless land of endless feuds
and bloodthirsty tribal raids owe more to Victorian romanticism than to ob-
jective reality. To be sure, parts of the region, particularly those dominated by
the Pashtuns, are often witness to bloodshed and are not infrequently hobbled
by feuds. Yet despite poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, maternal and infant
mortality, and human longevity rates at or near the worst in the world, when
not subjected to external pressure, most of the Pashtuns are peaceful pastoral-
ists and subsistence farmers in a feudal economy who have few of the rising
economic interests historically present in people’s revolutions.36 Revolution,
when it has come to southern Afghanistan and northern Pakistan, has there-
fore historically been less economically driven, as it is in many cases in other
parts of the world, than culturally and religiously driven. Thus it is a danger-
ous mistake to misinterpret or dismiss the cultural customs that have so fre-
quently conjured Pashtun jihads against nationally based forms of governance.
Invasion of Afghanistan and a Safe Haven in the FATA
The invasion of Afghanistan following the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, spurred an inºux of Taliban and al-Qaida militants into the FATA that
would eventually result in the consolidation of extremist control in the region.
Attempts by the Pakistani government after September 11 to exert military
control proved costly in both lives and political capital. Several hundred
Pakistani Army personnel were killed in the ªghting between 2004 and 2007,
most victims of ambushes, mines, or a general lack of experience in counterin-
surgency. It was this failure of the Pakistani Army to bring the FATA under
military control that compelled Pervez Musharraf’s regime to change tack and
pursue several “peace deals” with cowed tribal leaders fronting for the Taliban
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leadership in Waziristan in 2004, 2005, and 2006. News reports suggested that
the leader of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, played a role in crafting the terms and
inducing a number of tribal ªgures to sign the 2006 accord.37 Under the terms
of the 2006 deal, known as the Miranshah “peace agreement” of North
Waziristan, the Pakistani Army released all prisoners it had taken in the pre-
vious ªghting in the area, returned all weapons seized, and paid reparations
for all damages caused by the Pakistani Army. In addition, the army agreed to
cease its patrols and to dismantle all of its temporary checkpoints within the
FATA, as well as to withdraw all of its troops to large established garrisons in a
few signiªcant towns and along important crossroads. In exchange, militant
religious leaders who signed the agreement, such as Nek Mohammed,38 prom-
ised not to shelter foreign militants—a promise they claimed almost immedi-
ately they had never made. By August 2007 the “peace deal” had publicly
collapsed; the policy of appeasement was beyond spin control; and the
Musharraf regime had lurched back to the military option it had abandoned
just a year earlier with no clear idea of what to try next.
Widespread political assassinations, terrorist attacks, and periods of intense
combat with Pakistani military and paramilitary forces since the arrival of
Afghan Taliban in early 2002 have made the border area Pakistan’s most radi-
calized and most troubling. An analysis of the ªghting in Waziristan in mid-
2007 between rival Taliban commanders provides evidence of the extent to
which FATA’s seven agencies have been “Talibanized.”39 When intense
ªghting broke out in Waziristan shortly after the Pakistan government con-
cluded the 2006 peace deal and pulled back its troops, Pakistani ofªcials
depicted it as a case of the tribal leaders taking on foreign ªghters themselves.
They portrayed the clashes to the Western press and Western diplomats as
proof that the peace agreement was already working to empower tribal lead-
ers, when in fact the ªghting was proof of the exact opposite, and indeed sug-
gested that the Taliban were consolidating their control of Waziristan.
In reality, the battles in question occurred not between locals and foreign
ªghters, as the Pakistani government sought to portray, but rather between
two rival Taliban mullahs: Mullah Nazir and Mullah Omar (not Mullah
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Mohammed Omar, the leader of the Taliban, but a less prominent ªgure of the
same name, whom we call “Mullah Omar the Lesser” to avoid confusion).
Mullah Nazir created this rivalry by seizing the leadership of the Ahmadzai
Waziris from Mullah Omar the Lesser, who had brought a small radical
splinter group of Uzbeks under his wing. Mullah Omar the Lesser’s Uzbeks
then killed two al-Qaida operatives in Waziristan, Saiful Asad and Sheikh
Asadullah (a Saudi bagman), both guests of Mullah Nazir and therefore under
his protection. The killings sparked a round of combat to eliminate the splinter
group. Between 90 and 95 percent of the 1,000 to 2,000 Uzbek radicals in the
FATA, however—those outside the splinter group—were unaffected by this
round of consolidation of Taliban command and control.
Since 2001 the Taliban has targeted Waziri tribal leaders through a combina-
tion of assassination and intimidation. More than 200 tribal elders who re-
sisted Taliban domination were reported murdered by Taliban agents in the
FATA in 2005 and 2006.40 This case demonstrates not only the extent to which
the Taliban dominates the political space in Waziristan,41 but also the extent to
which information coming out of the FATA through ofªcial Pakistani channels
has been manipulated for Western consumption.
In 2007 the “Talibanization” spreading outward from the FATA across
northern Pakistan began to receive some belated attention in Western policy
circles. Talibanization has been focused largely on the Pashtun areas, where
militants have targeted video stores, girls’ schools, and other institutions that
they perceive as immoral. Islamic extremists have also publicly moved to chal-
lenge government authority and promote radical ideologies. Since 2006
Talibanization has expanded even to Peshawar, the relatively modern capital
of the NWFP. When similar acts of intimidation began to occur in Islamabad,
culminating in the commando raid against the Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) on
July 29, 2007, they should have served as a national and international wake-up
call. The unchecked, and apparently uncheckable, ability of extremists to pro-
mote Talibanization is a source of distress for many Pakistanis and led to criti-
cism of the Musharraf regime for its inability, or unwillingness, to take
effective action against them.42 The Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), which
President Musharraf made the ofªcial opposition party in the Pakistani
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Parliament after the 2002 elections, provides political cover to the extremists,
openly supports the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, and
maintains close ties to its leadership.43
With the collaboration of elements within one of Pakistan’s secret intelli-
gence services, the ISI, the Pashtun borderlands have become a safe haven for
the Taliban and other insurgent and terrorist elements. Since 2002 the FATA, in
particular, has provided a sanctuary for a growing insurgent network that has
struck Afghanistan with a vengeance.44 It provides an almost impregnable
base for command and control, fundraising, recruiting, training, and launch-
ing and recovery of military operations and terrorist attacks.45 Growing out-
ward from the FATA, extremism has spread across the Pashtun belt, and
Pashtun tribal areas in both Pakistan and Afghanistan are increasingly falling
under the de facto political control of the extremists. The Taliban and its asso-
ciated groups have used murder, arson, intimidation, bombings, and a sophis-
ticated information campaign to subvert traditional tribal governance
structures.
Pashtunwali: The Pashtun Social Code
Why have the Pashtuns provided a safe haven for the Taliban and al-Qaida,
while their neighbors along the same border have proven so resistant to such
religious radicalization? The issues fueling the low-intensity insurgency of the
Baluchis, for example, primarily involve self-determination and resource allo-
cation, not religious extremism. The Taliban ªnd no home among them. Simi-
larly for the restive Uighurs at the extreme eastern end of the border region in
western China, the issue is cultural survival and ethnic separatism, not radical
Islam. The Chitralis, while occupying lands as harsh and mountainous as
those of the Pashtuns, continue to welcome foreign visitors and want nothing
to do with the Taliban. Nor is the difference religious; with the minor excep-
tions noted earlier, all of the people of the border have internalized a devout
and conservative—if conceptually weak—understanding of Hanaª Sunni
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Islam. For all other ethnicities of the border region, the Taliban’s ideology
and radical violence in the name of Islam are equally anathema.
The explanation for the Pashtuns’ provision of safe haven to the Taliban and
al-Qaida lies in their unique social code, known as Pashtunwali: a set of values
and unwritten, but universally understood, precepts that deªne Pashtun cul-
ture. Pashtunwali, literally translated, means “the way of the Pashtun.” For
U.S. policymakers seeking to address the challenges of the Pashtun tribal ar-
eas, an understanding of the core principles of this cultural value system is
crucial.
Pashtunwali is the keystone of the Pashtuns’ identity and social structure,
and it shapes all forms of behavior from the cradle to the grave. Its rules are
largely responsible for the survival of the Pashtun tribes for more than 1,000
years, but they remain little understood in the West. As Charles Allen writes,
“[Pashtunwali is] an uncompromising social code so profoundly at odds with
Western mores that its application constantly brings one up with a jolt.”46 A
Pashtun must adhere to this code to maintain his honor and retain his identity.
The worst obscenity one Pashtun can call another is dauz, or “person with no
honor.” In a closed, interdependent rural society, a Pashtun family without
honor becomes a pariah, unable to compete for advantageous marriages or
economic opportunities, and shunned by the other families as a disgrace to the
clan. Pashtunwali also provides a legal framework for social interaction. As
James Spain writes, “Despite the fact that it has perpetuated the blood feud,
[Pashtunwali] provides for what is probably the maximum amount of law and
order in a society of warrior tribes. While it is true that for the most part it is
the individual who acts on the code, the community at large judges with re-
markable unanimity the righteousness of his action and supports it or opposes
it. [Pashtunwali] is still by all odds the strongest force in the tribal area, and the
hill [Pashtuns] . . . accepts no law but their own.”47
Intrinsically ºexible and dynamic, Pashtunwali has core tenets that include
self-respect, independence, justice, hospitality, forgiveness, and tolerance. Not
all Pashtuns embody the ideal type deªned by Pashtunwali, but all respect its
core values and admire—if sometimes grudgingly—those who do. When
hillmen come down out of the mountains to buy staples in the bazaar of a val-
ley town, with their long ªghting knives visible in their waistbands, the towns-
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people are likely to sneak admiring glances and mutter something to their
friends about “real Pashtuns.”
This division between highland Pashtuns and those living in the better lands
at lower elevations is another major fault line running through Pashtun soci-
ety. Akbar Ahmed has termed this the divide between nang and qalang cul-
tures: nang referring to the honor code of the hillmen, and qalang referring to
the superior, irrigated farmlands of the valley historically susceptible to taxa-
tion.48 This divide is the source of the Pashtun proverb that “honor ate up the
mountains, and taxes ate up the plains.” Insurgency in Afghanistan has always
sprung from the hills, fostered by the nang culture, and the Taliban is no
exception.
Pashtunwali imposes on Pashtun society a set of critical obligations. In gen-
eral terms, Pashtunwali is the sum total of the tribes’ collective expectations
of their members to conform to the norms and customs that ensure the
group’s survival as a distinct sociocultural entity. In the perceptions of most
Pashtuns, group consensus remains the primary source of power, and the
salah-mashwarah, or “discussion,” is the main forum where all important issues
are discussed and resolved. For matters of particular gravity or consequence,
such as murders or treaty negotiations, a jirga—a traditional assembly of all
the tribes’ adult male members—may be called, but this is not a simple matter.
The egalitarian character of the jirga and the salah-mashwarah are in direct con-
trast with a hierarchical state power structure. Both are driven by the consen-
sus of the group, composed of equal individuals. It is understood that
representation is a bottom-up structure, operating within a system based on
the concept of equality.49
Pashtunwali is essentially self-enforcing. All Pashtuns embrace it, and all ac-
cept the ªnality of the jirga process as the impartial arbiter of tribal law. Al-
though the ultimate meeting of elders at which judgment is ªnalized is often
conºated with the word “jirga,” that meeting is only a ritual capstone. The
jirga, when called to resolve a conºict, is not a singular event, but rather a com-
plex sequence of events in a protracted, consultative, and deliberative process
that may take months to conclude. The adjudication of an accidental killing
within a khel, for example, typically begins with the selection of a committee of
elders who are deputized to function as a combination of judge and jury for
the matter. They begin by ritually placing a rock between the homes of the af-
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fected parties. This step, known as tigah, or “placing the stone,” provides an in-
violable truce period in which the selected elders conduct investigations,
discussions, and deliberations. They will meet many times to establish the
facts, visit both households to obtain the commitment of both families to bind
themselves into the process and respect its outcome, call witnesses, hear evi-
dence, and consider compensatory options. Deliberations may go on for days,
and the ªnal decision must be unanimous, as no man may be bound by a deci-
sion he does not accept. Fairness and collective justice are the ultimate good,
not punishment of the individual wrongdoer in the Western sense, which for
the Pashtuns is essentially an alien concept. When a settlement is arrived at, it
is vetted with both families prior to the ªnal meeting at which judgment is
pronounced, allowing families time to reconcile younger, more hotheaded
members to the decision. The judgment will keep within valuative norms es-
tablished by tradition and may involve the transfer of land, money, or a female
family member to the aggrieved family in compensation. At no time, even at
the capstone meeting, do members of the two families appear in the same
room at the same time.
Rejection of the settlement by either family is rare. Noncompliance with
the judgment, however, means excommunication from the village. The usual
remedy for a family that rejects the terms and attempts to remain in place is to
have its home(s) burned down.
Pashtunwali is neither the absence of governance, nor summary judgment,
nor a lynch mob at work. Rather, it is an alternative form of social organization
with an advanced conºict resolution mechanism that does not involve court-
houses, jails, lawyers, law schools, bailiffs, county clerks, prisons, prison
guards, judges, or policemen. It has been estimated that jirgas resolve 95 per-
cent of the cases in which they are invoked.50 Perhaps most important for U.S.
security interests in the region, the millions of tribesmen who live within this
system have no desire to have a new, alien system imposed on them by outsid-
ers. Furthermore, Pashtuns are generally convinced that their system of social
order produces men superior to those of the Western model. While justice and
responsibility are collective, however, at the individual level, Pashtunwali en-
compasses four central personal values: freedom, honor, revenge, and chivalry.
For a Pashtun male, Pashtunwali is foremost about personal independence.
Pashtuns of the hills pride themselves on their freedom from authority and on
their social equality. In principle, no Pashtun male may tell any other adult
Pashtun male what to do. Unlike their neighbors the Baluchis, for example,
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who invest their tribal sardars with many of the leadership powers of a tradi-
tional tribal chief, any sort of external direction is not merely abhorrent to
Pashtuns, but lies beyond their mental compass. Given the Pashtuns’ commu-
nal responsibility, in which all extended family members share equally in the
consequences for the actions of each individual, and the collective nature of
group decisionmaking, the strong sense of male freedom is more about free-
dom from being ordered what to do than freedom to do what he pleases.
The position of the khan and the malik in Pashtun hill society is often mis-
understood in this regard. The khan of a clan, typically an older patriarch who
has acquired a combination of land, wealth, battle honors, wives, and off-
spring, is only a primus inter pares. He is venerated but cannot give orders to
anyone outside his immediate family.51 Nor can a malik, who carries consider-
able weight in council and village affairs but is essentially a democratically se-
lected spokesman for the clan, a position that in some cases is hereditary.
Pashtun tribal society is thus inherently resistant to externally or internally im-
posed hierarchical order as a fundamental social value.52 With its own conºict
resolution mechanisms, Pashtun hill society is one in which government and
externally imposed order are not simply anathema but the antithesis of what is
good.
After personal freedom, Pashtunwali demands that a man have an exagger-
ated sense of personal honor. Although there is no word in Pashto for the ab-
stract Western concept of “honor,” the word nang, representing a man’s
obligation to protect the inviolability of his person, his property, and his
women, best captures this concept. In the past, this has created a great deal of
tension between Pashtuns and states attempting to establish their own rule
of law. The very concept of justice is wrapped up in a Pashtun’s maintenance
of his honor and his independence from external authority. Action that must
be taken to preserve honor but that breaks the laws of a state would seem per-
fectly acceptable to a Pashtun. In fact, his honor would demand it.53
The conºuence of independence, consensus, and honor also creates a social
dynamic in which military leadership is a temporary appointed position. The
individual selected to lead a clan’s military force, or lashkar, is designated by
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consensus based on a number of factors, only one of which may be demon-
strated tactical prowess. Males agree to follow the military leadership of this
appointed member of their clan because the position is temporary and because
they had a say in the selection process. It is not, however, honorable for a man
to ªght under another clan’s leadership. Thus the largest operational military
unit that may be formed under ordinary circumstances is the khel, which will
ªght, as Olivier Roy noted, until it reaches its tribal boundaries and then
will stop.54 The sole exception to this is a holy war. It is not dishonorable to
ªght for a charismatic mullah who is seen to have received divine inspiration
to carry forward the banner of Islam. Thus, Pashtunwali creates a conservative
dynamic in which large-scale warfare and social change take place only under
religious leadership—such as that of the Taliban’s Mullah Omar.
The third essential value of Pashtunwali is badal, which can mean both “ex-
change” and “revenge.” In a badal wedding, for example, two brides are effec-
tively “exchanged,” one from each family for a son of the other. But it also
means “exchange” in the sense of “an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.” If
a man suffers a dishonor, badal for that loss of nang must follow, or he will lose
face and social status to the point of becoming an outcast. Revenge may take
time: as one Pashtun proverb goes, “I took my revenge after a hundred years,
and I only regret that I acted in haste.” Indeed, it may take generations to
avenge the wrong, but retribution will be the focus of the family’s life until
honor is recouped.
The fourth precept of Pashtunwali demands the provision of hospitality,
protection, and refuge to all who require it. For the Pashtun, this behavior cov-
ers a spectrum, from the basic obligation to provide hospitality (melmastia) to
anyone coming into his home, including strangers, to a remarkable form of
chivalry toward one’s enemies called nanawatey. Nanawatey literally means
“going in,” in the sense of surrendering oneself to the mercy of another person.
It is of course a sign of weakness in the person who asks it, but, critically, it
cannot honorably be refused, even if the seeker has done some grievous wrong
to the person asked. Many frontier tales are told of a man continuing to grant
nanawatey to someone discovered to be a mortal enemy, rather than lose his
honor by failing in this absolute obligation. The provider must give shelter,
food, drink, clothing, and personal protection to the seeker for an indetermi-
nate but temporary period, even at the cost of his own life. U.S. ofªcials who
demanded that the Taliban turn over bin Laden after September 11 experi-
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enced nanawatey without knowing it, when the Taliban refused on the grounds
that bin Laden was a guest in Afghanistan, and thus effectively in an inviola-
ble sphere of protection.
For centuries, these interlocking elements of the unwritten code of the
Pashtun—freedom, honor, revenge, and chivalry—have defeated every effort
to subdue the Pashtuns and supersede Pashtunwali with a more codiªed and
centralized rule of law. Nevertheless, Western policymakers continue to ignore
or to downplay the primacy of these fundamental cultural values in their ef-
forts to shape strategies for southern Afghanistan and northern Pakistan,
while the Taliban and al-Qaida use them for recruitment, shelter, and social
mobilization.
The Insurgency in the Border Area and Beyond
The Taliban and al-Qaida militants are using the lands of the Pashtun as a
launching pad for attacks to destabilize both Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well
as a training ground for terrorist attacks worldwide. The border area has
proven particularly vital to the Afghan Taliban, who form the bulk of the
Afghan insurgency and operate from bases inside Pakistan. The Pashtun belt is
also home to insurgent forces led by Afghan Islamist Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s
Hizb-i-Islami (HIG) Party, the jihadi network of Maulawi Jalaluddin Haqqani
(known as the Haqqani Faction), the Tora Bora Front, ªghters from Hizb-i-
Islami Khalis (HIK, now largely under the control of Haji Din Mohammed, the
governor of Kabul Province), the growing Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan under
Baitullah Mahsud,55 as well as other foreign and domestic jihadi forces.56
These insurgent forces represent an existential threat to the Karzai regime, a
growing threat to the Pakistani government, and an enormous challenge to re-
gional stability.57
Waziri and Mahsud Pashtun mullahs, who are harboring al-Qaida and sup-
porting the Taliban, stepped up attacks against government forces in the fall of
2007, after scrapping the 2006 “peace agreement” in North Waziristan. After
the Red Mosque siege in Islamabad, militant groups renounced the treaty and
Taliban ªghters in Pakistan proclaimed an all-out guerrilla war against the
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Pakistani Army.58 Suicide bombings, indirect ªre attacks, ambushes, and im-
provised explosive devices (IEDs) have targeted soldiers and police with un-
precedented frequency and sophistication.59 In August 2007 a battalion of
more than 300 Pakistani Army soldiers together with nine of their ofªcers, in-
cluding a lieutenant colonel, surrendered to militants without ªring a shot, an
event without parallel in the sixty-year history of the Pakistani Army. The
frontier town of Tank remains under siege. Throughout the Pashtun belt, an
average of more than one girls’ school a day was burned down or bombed in
2007, a rate faster than they can be built, replaced, or repaired. In Afghanistan,
where the U.S. Agency for International Development has built hundreds of
schools since 2001, the Taliban burned down 1,089 from 2005 to 2007.60
The radicalization has metastasized far beyond the FATA into Afghanistan,
Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province, the Punjab, and the Sind. In the Swat
District, once an international tourist haven known as the “Switzerland of
Asia,” the Pakistani Army has been engaged in pitched battles with heavily
armed insurgents since December 2007 in an attempt to retake the area from
another charismatic religious leader, Maulana Fazlullah, nicknamed “Maulana
Radio” for his pirate all-jihad format FM radio station preaching Islamic revo-
lution against the state. As with pronouncements about the success of the
peace deals in the FATA, all reports of progress in Swat should be subjected to
rigorous ground-sourced analytical scrutiny. (Parts of the U.S. government
seem all too eager, however, to accept at face value the sincerity of both infor-
mation from, and alliance with, the ISI.) The assassination of Benazir Bhutto in
December 2007 by extremists in the army headquarters town of Rawalpindi
was yet another tragic indication of their growing reach and ability to pene-
trate Pakistani security.
Most alarmingly, in late 2004 the Talibanization of the north began to assume
aspects of a more global character. Tactics used widely by Iraqi insurgents and
al-Qaida ªghters in Iraq started to appear in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border
area and have since spread widely. Intelligence analysts believe this is evi-
dence of an al-Qaida-afªliated information network linking jihadist move-
ments in multiple theaters of operation with loose operational coordination
on a global scale and of a capability to move at least small numbers of person-
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nel from one operational theater to another. Taliban members known to have
participated in the ªghting in Iraq have been killed by coalition forces
in Afghanistan, as have jihadis from other countries, including Chechens,
Uzbeks, and even a few Turks. The entire border area has been wracked by a
sharp increase in suicide attacks, roadside bombings with the use of improved
and more deadly IEDs, and the executions of “spies.”61 In 2006 Afghanistan
suffered an algebraic increase in violence, including 139 suicide attacks—a
fourfold increase over 2005—and approximately 1,600 incidents of IEDs—
triple the numbers for 2005.62 The year 2007 continued the steady, unbroken
upward trend of insurgent violence in Afghanistan since 2002.
More signiªcant than the novelty of some of these technologies and tactics is
the fact that they are foreign to traditional Afghan mores and contradict
Pashtun tribal and religious values.63 This worrisome development suggests a
growing linkage between elements of the global jihad and the emergence of a
transnational jihadi culture. An analysis of Taliban shabnamah (night letters),
which forms a major tactical component of the Taliban’s information and psy-
chological operations campaigns, suggests that “the Afghan insurgency might
very well be morphing into a campaign with more transnational concerns.”64
During the entire Soviet occupation of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989, there
was not a single conªrmed suicide bombing against Soviet military forces or
their family members. The ªrst such attack in Afghanistan was committed by
two Arabs against Ahmad Shah Massoud, military leader of the United
Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, on September 9, 2001. Even to-
day, few of the suicide bombers are Pashtuns born and raised in the tribal ar-
eas. The Taliban has essentially outsourced this operational requirement to al-
Qaida, via a network of extremist mosques in the Middle East and Pakistan
that provide operational centers from which to identify and recruit youths
who have become isolated from their traditional tribal support networks.
Many are in fact speciªcally targeted because they are adrift from their
tribal moorings, having grown up on the streets of Karachi or in refugee camps
where family and tribal structures have collapsed. Recruits for suicide bomb-
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ings are frequently unemployed or underemployed; some are mentally unsta-
ble; and a signiªcant number have physical disabilities.65
In Pakistan’s FATA and NWFP, the accelerating use of other imported
tactics, such as attacks with IEDs, is another indicator of this trend. Taliban in-
formation campaign themes too have shifted, to highlight military capabilities
and political goals, a trend that likewise seems to be borrowed from the Iraqi
conºict. The late and unlamented Taliban commander Mullah Dadullah, killed
in 2007 by coalition forces, was at the forefront of one such campaign. He fre-
quently appeared in extensive interviews as part of propaganda video produc-
tions released by studios such as as-Sahab and Labyak. Dadullah was also
featured in exclusive coverage on the satellite channel al-Jazeera.66 Dadullah’s
efforts were apparently intended to justify and glorify Iraqi-style insurgent
tactics, and to promote Taliban credibility and support on a regional basis.67
Signiªcantly, shortly before his death, Dadullah started using the term “feda-
yeen” in Pashto-language interviews to refer to the numerous suicide bombers
he had allegedly recruited. In addition, al-Jazeera’s translated coverage of
Dadullah used the term “sacriªcial operations” instead of “martyrdom opera-
tions.”68 The migration of Arabic terms such as “intifada” and “fedayeen,”
long associated with the Palestinian-Israeli conºict, to the Afghan theater is
another indication of a Taliban merger with transnational radical elements.
The ideologue behind introducing these concepts among the Taliban leader-
ship is reportedly Ayman al-Zawahiri.
The Unintended Consequences of Border Politics
To understand how the Taliban and associated groups were able to reach this
powerful position, it is necessary to examine the border politics that gave rise
to them, beginning with the creation of the boundary line itself. The Durand
line, which was negotiated and formalized in 1893, was drawn by a team of
British surveyors, led by Sir Mortimer Durand, to create a boundary between
colonial British India and Afghanistan. To a great extent, the line followed the
contours of convenient geographical features, as well as the existing limits of
British authority, rather than tribal borders. It divided the homelands of the
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Pashtun tribes nearly equally between Afghanistan and Pakistan, effectively
cutting the Pashtun nation in half. This largely imaginary boundary has been
viewed since its inception with contempt and resentment by Pashtuns on both
sides of the line. As a practical matter, the border is unenforced and unenforce-
able. In some places the position of the line is disputed; in others it is inaccessi-
ble to all but trained mountain climbers; in still others it cuts through the
middle of villages and even through individual homes.
The majority of the Pashtun tribes and clans that control the frontier zones of
eastern and southern Afghanistan along the Durand line have never accepted
the legitimacy of what they believe to be an arbitrary and capricious boundary.
During the colonial period, Kabul treated its border areas with India as a kind
of Afghan Appalachia, while the British colonial ofªcials on the other side re-
signed themselves to the uncontrollability of the heart of the tribal areas. The
issue of what to do with the tribal areas was never resolved by the British.
Their frontier problems were handed over to India in 1947 on the eve of inde-
pendence and partition. Although the tribes agreed in a plebiscite to be part of
Pakistan, the boundary line became a political football and a major source of
tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan after 1948.
Afghanistan opposed Pakistan’s entry into the United Nations because it
claimed that its border with Pakistan was not valid. Kabul argued correctly
and with considerable legal acumen that the original treaty establishing the
Durand line as the border was signed under duress. Afghanistan also claimed,
with less legal validity, that the treaty was signed by a state that no longer ex-
isted. (The treaty obligations of British India with respect to international
boundaries remained binding upon its successor states). In 1949 an Afghan
loya jirga declared the Durand line invalid.69 From the 1950s to the 1970s, the
Afghan governments in which Minister Mohammed Daoud (later President
Daoud, after his coup that sent the late King Zahir Shah into exile in 1972)
played a leading role used the idea of an independent Pashtun state, to be
called “Pashtunistan,” as leverage against successive Pakistani governments.
The Pakistanis for their part sought to bring Afghanistan into their sphere of
inºuence to extend Pakistan’s “strategic depth.”
Landlocked, heavily dependent on Pakistan for imports and access to the
sea, and badly outmatched economically and militarily, Afghanistan had little
other leverage to exert. So it continues to play the Pashtunistan card, threaten-
ing the fragile Pakistani state—in the wake of the cathartic loss of its eastern
province to the newly independent Bangladesh in 1971—with the similar loss
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of much of its northern territory into a new Pashtun state. (That much of
southern Afghanistan would likely also have been pulled away into the new
Pashtunistan, making the policy suicidal for the Afghan state, appears to have
occurred to neither side.) To the Pakistani government, the specter of the frag-
mentation of the entire country—an artiªcial construct sharing nothing more
than a common religion to begin with—seemed real indeed.
Afghanistan sought to increase the pressure on Pakistan by creating
“Pashtunistan madrassas” in the border areas.70 These were boarding schools
where Afghan and transborder Pakistani schoolboys wore uniforms with a
miniature ºag of Pashtunistan on their sleeves and said a pledge of allegiance
to the ºag of Pashtunistan in their schoolyards each morning. A major square
in Kabul was renamed “Pashtunistan Square.” Although the madrassas are
long gone, the idea of Pashtunistan remains strong in Pakistan’s secular
Pashtun political party, the Awami National Party (ANP). The ANP is led by
Asfandyar Wali Khan, and represents the political descendent of the Khudai
Khidmatgar (“Red Shirt”) movement of the legendary Abdul Ghafar Khan, the
“Frontier Ghandi.”71 Short of independence, the ANP continues to agitate for
the creation of a new Pashtun province to be called Pushtunkhwa (“Land of
Pashtuns”), which would incorporate the NWFP, the FATA, Punjab’s Attock
and Mianwali Districts, and northeastern Baluchistan, all prominent Pashtun
areas.72 One popular bumper sticker in Peshawar in 2007 read “NWFP 
Name Wanted for Province.”73
Many Pakistanis, prone to see the sinister hand of India behind all Pakistani
misfortunes, are convinced that the ANP is funded by the Indian government
as a countermeasure to Pakistani support for insurgent groups in the Kashmir
region, and dismissed it as a fringe party. The ANP surprised many observers
in February 2007, however, with a victory over the once-invincible MMAParty
in elections in Bajaur and swept into power in the NWFP in February 2008.
Border politics are not dead in Afghanistan either. Afghan President Karzai
has stated that he does not accept the border demarcation because “it has
raised a wall between the two brothers.”74 Indeed, any other border policy po-
sition would be political suicide in Kabul. In short, the Durand line is accepted
as a valid legal boundary by almost no one in the border region.
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The notion of Pashtunistan for the Pashtuns (who constitute the largest
ethnic group in the world without a nation-state) has never had any real inter-
national support. Afghanistan’s policy of promoting such an entity, however,
has had far-reaching unintended consequences, of which the United States’ lat-
est and largest foreign policy dilemma is the most recent manifestation. To
counter the growing threat of Pashtun nationalism and the potential secession
of Pashtunistan following the Bangladesh debacle, successive Pakistani gov-
ernments, formalized by President Gen. Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq in 1977,
launched a different social force as a political counterweight: conservative
Islam.
Thus was born a massive experiment in social engineering in northern
Pakistan. Beginning in the early 1970s, the Pakistani government embarked on
the construction of thousands of conservative madrassas in Pashtun areas,
funded by private Saudi sources that emphasized Islam over ethnic identity.
Slowly but steadily, Pakistani governments began to invest the scarcely literate
mullahs of the rural areas with more political weight, empowering them and
their ulema shuras at the expense of the tribal elders, khans, and maliks. Even
so, such cultural meddling was unlikely to have any signiªcant lasting impact
on tribal behavior over such a wide area, barring some kind of huge social up-
heaval that would undermine the existing tribal structures. That upheaval
came in 1979, when Soviet tanks rolled across the Amu Darya River at Termez,
eventually killing more than 1 million Pashtuns, driving 3 million more into
exile, and devastating the social fabric of tribal society. It was the response to
the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan that dramatically acceler-
ated Pakistan’s social experiment and ultimately spun it out of control.
That response was largely in the form of massive covert international
support for the jihad against the Soviets. To facilitate it, the Pakistani govern-
ment recognized seven Afghan Sunni mujahideen parties, which became
known as the “Peshawar Seven.” (There were also three unrecognized and un-
supported Shiite mujahideen parties composed mostly of Afghan Hazaras and
Qizilbashis.) Six of the seven were composed almost entirely of Pashtuns, in
which Ghilzais and Karlanris played a dominant role. Because large-scale mili-
tary organization among the Pashtun can occur only under religious leader-
ship, all six had religious leaders in overall control. (Even in the seventh,
Jamiat-i-Islam, which increasingly became the party of non-Pashtun Sunnis as
the war progressed, theologian Burhanuddin Rabbani had considerable opera-
tional inºuence.)
The United States and Saudi Arabia poured $7.2 billion of covert aid into the
jihad against the Soviets, the vast majority of which was channeled by the ISI,
with the acquiescence of the Central Intelligence Agency, to the most radical
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religious elements, deliberately marginalizing Durrani Pashtuns and those
parties with a less radical, more nationalist political vision for the future of
Afghanistan. Foreign militants ºowed into Pakistan for training and then de-
ployed into Afghanistan. Among them were several thousand funded and
paid by Osama bin Laden.75 Relationships were forged that continue to plague
the United States. Worse, Pashtun tribal society became increasingly radical-
ized. After the Soviets withdrew, the social fabric of the Pashtuns was further
shredded by returning commanders and ªghters who set themselves up in
many cases as warlords outside the authority of the tribal elders. The result
was anarchy, as mujahideen groups, warlords, and common criminals fought
over the carcass of Afghanistan.
When it became evident to Islamabad and the ISI that ªrst, their favorite
mujahideen commander, Ghilzai Pashtun Islamist (and HiG Party leader)
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, would never gain political control over Afghanistan
and, second, that the anarchy in Afghanistan was antithetical to a policy of
strategic depth as well as potentially destabilizing for Pakistan, the Taliban
was born. Beginning from a minor local movement in Kandahar Province in
1994 with few weapons and even less money, with massive covert Pakistani
ªnancial and military support, the Taliban rose to power and took over Kabul
in 1996.76 The Taliban furthered the process of deconstructing the dominant
role of the tribal elders in the rural areas from 1996 to 2001 and supplanting
them with ulema shuras.
Thus, since the 1970s, in pursuit of domestic stability and its foreign policy
interests in Afghanistan, Pakistan has deliberately deconstructed much of the
1,000-year-old tribal order in the Pashtun areas. In retrospect, this social engi-
neering to empower radical Muslim extremists, aided and abetted for a decade
by the CIA to bleed the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in retribution for its in-
volvement in Vietnam, was incredibly short-sighted. While the decline of tra-
ditional tribal governance in the short run helped recruit many mujahideen, it
also led to the radicalization of the tribal areas and the opening of the FATA to
jihadist movements and radicals such as bin Laden.
There was no absence of sage counsel speaking against the creation of such a
Frankenstein monster: the late Afghan king, Zahir Shah (then in exile in
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Rome), Hamid Karzai (then in contact with the CIA station in Peshawar), and
ofªcials within the U.S. State Department, among others, all warned against
the dangers of arming, training, and funding radical Islamic extremists on
such a massive scale.77 They were ignored.
Many of the original architects of the Islamicization of northern Pakistan
may have believed that they could eventually re-create the traditional malik/
khan/elder-based social system once the Pashtunistan threat had burned itself
out, and later, when the Soviets had been defeated and driven out of Afghani-
stan. If so, they were betrayed by the ISI agents who ran the mujahideen pro-
gram, who saw a continued domestic and foreign policy use for the radical
movement in Afghanistan and the Kashmir, which they believed they could
manipulate. Thus, after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, ofªcial support to the
radicals continued, in the form of covert assistance and an overtly uneven po-
litical playing ªeld in which the radical political parties such as the Jamiat-ul-
Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) and the MMA were given every advantage, while moder-
ate and nationalist parties such as the ANP were systematically subverted and
harassed. The policy of politicizing the ulema continued, and the social fabric
of the tribal areas further disintegrated.
In 2008 the monster created in this ill-conceived experiment is virtually out
of control. Apart from short-term tactical military successes, the political mo-
mentum of radicalization in the north appears to have gone beyond the power
of the Pakistani state to contain it, let alone suppress it, which suggests that the
odds of the radical fundamentalist genie being put back into the bottle are
slim. The near-term policy consequences of this ongoing radicalization, and
the failure of the Pakistani government to prohibit refuge for the Taliban as
well as foreign jihadis in the FATA, are the continued destabilization of south-
ern Afghanistan, the spread of the Taliban insurgency, and the further subver-
sion of democracy in Pakistan. This in turn has contributed to Washington’s
mild but growing criticism of Pakistan’s border policies since mid-2007 and a
slow but discernable drift of U.S.-Pakistani relations at the strategic level. The
long-term consequences of this process of radicalization, if left unchecked, are
potentially devastating for the United States.
Conclusion
A century ago, the volatility of a particular section of the borderlands between
South and Central Asia was a regional problem; a difªcult but localized
challenge to generations of British soldiers and administrators on India’s
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Northwest Frontier. In an era of international jihad and networked nonstate
terrorism, however, the same mountain fastnesses and social code that per-
plexed the Raj now represent a truly global threat. The most remote place
on earth has become the most dangerous. The attacks of September 11, the
London subway bombings, the March 11 Madrid bombings, and most of the
other recent strikes at Western civilization were planned and trained for there,
and more are being planned there at this very minute. “War, red war,”
Kipling’s border thief promised,78 and it has come.
Yet the United States has no long-term security problems with the Baluchis,
the Chitralis, the Tajiks, the Nuristanis, or any of the myriad tribal groups
along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, save one: the Pashtuns. The challenge
for U.S. security interests in South Asia is thus, at its center, not a social prob-
lem, or a religious problem, or a generic “tribal” problem. It is a unique cul-
tural problem, which is especially problematic for a country whose ethos and
foreign policymaking paradigm is the national sublimation of culture in favor
of assimilation through democracy. Alone among the many peoples and cul-
tures of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, however, it is the Pashtun people
who have proven both susceptible to religious extremist movements and resis-
tant to the imposition of external governance. The reason is that the fragile
equilibrium of social order in this uniquely segmentary, acephalous, and inher-
ently conservative society yields to religious zealotry whenever weakened
from the inside or pressured excessively from the outside, precisely because
of its lack of unitary leadership and the unbending nature of its compulsory
social code, Pashtunwali.
For the United States, the short-term solution for bringing the Pashtun lands
back from the radical brink is to strengthen and rebuild the tribal structures
from the inside while reducing the pressures on them from the outside, rather
than the current policy of doing the opposite. Exerting external pressure on
Pashtun tribal leaders in Pakistan and Afghanistan has done nothing to lessen
the continuing radicalization of the Pashtun tribes, and in fact has had a dele-
terious effect. The answer is not to ignore the culture, or to attempt to further
subvert the position of the tribal elders and maliks whose collective control
is the only stabilizing force the region has ever known. In Afghanistan,
rather than applying external pressure by seeking to extend the reach of the
anathematic central government, an action that historically has fomented in-
surrection among the proto-insurgent Pashtun, the United States and the inter-
national community should be doing everything in their means to empower
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the tribal elders and restore the traditional balance to the system. One way to
start in Afghanistan would be to amend the constitution to elect provincial
governors and deputy governors directly, rather than the current method of
having outsiders imposed upon the Pashtun provinces by ªat from Kabul.
The Pashtun tribal belt encompasses a culture in which broad, lasting social
change happens only with the consent of rural religious authority. This neces-
sitates a policy of gradually returning the mullahs to their traditional role of
spiritual advisers and mentors to the people rather than that of community
decisionmakers. When the Pashtuns are under social pressure, jihad is born at
the turning point in which that religious consent morphs into leadership. Yet
stability is possible. Southern Afghanistan, for example, was neither radical
nor unstable in the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s, when the national govern-
ment was invisible in the tribal lands south of Ghazni, west of Jalalabad, and
east of Kandahar, but a foreign visitor could have walked unmolested from
Kandahar to Kabul relying entirely on hospitality along the way. The Pashtun
homelands are not inherently lawless lands of constant warfare, Victorian pulp
ªction and modern blogosphere hyperbole notwithstanding.
The next step is to bring rapid improvements in everyday people’s lives
in the Pashtun belt, where in many places one child in three still dies before
her ªfth birthday. These improvements must begin to be felt quickly across
a broad sweep of the Pashtun lands, before spreading Talibanization can fur-
ther consolidate its position among the people and make their denial a self-
fulªlling prophecy. The level of nonsecurity-related (i.e., police and army) aid
actually reaching the Pashtun people in Afghanistan since the U.S. invasion
has been shockingly low, less than $5 per Pashtun per year,79 an astonishingly
miserly effort considering the critical strategic nature of the region. As sug-
gested elsewhere, military tactics, too, such as the preeminence of intrusive
sweep operations, the emphasis on the so-called kill/capture mission, and the
indiscriminate use of airpower in inhabited areas have been extremely damag-
ing to counterinsurgency efforts among a revenge-oriented people with a zero
tolerance for insult and “collateral damage.”80 The military tactics of the
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United States and its NATO allies must undergo a sweeping change in recog-
nition of Pashtun cultural realities. Most U.S. soldiers deploying to Afghani-
stan still receive little or no cultural or language training.
Furthermore, because of the highly segmentary nature of rural Pashtun
society, current U.S. and NATO attempts to administer and implement recon-
struction and rural development from the provincial level, via Provincial Re-
construction Teams, instead of at the district level with District Reconstruction
Teams, are doomed. Historically, all attempts to develop and improve the
Pashtun areas of Afghanistan from the provincial level have failed. The current
troop-to-task ratio is simply inadequate. Time is running out, and public per-
ceptions of U.S. and NATO forces are edging ever closer to those of the Soviets
in the Pashtun collective consciousness. It is probably already too late to pre-
vent some political accommodation with the Taliban, at least in the south, by
the Afghan government, but Pashtuns do not negotiate when in a position of
relative strength or when they appear to be winning, as the all-Pashtun Taliban
believe they are now.81
In Pakistan, the permissive conditions enabling the Taliban must be con-
fronted, not with rhetoric and empty promises, but with action—and not vacil-
lating, half-hearted measures, but strong and consistent Pakistani military
action wherever required and at whatever cost. Because Pashtuns never nego-
tiate from a position of strength, such negotiations and “peace deals” are sim-
ply seen as a sign of weakness by the radicals. The majority of the Pakistani
people, however, detest the extremists, do not want the name of their country
and its illustrious founder associated with terrorists and suicide bombers, and
will accept more assertive military action in the north if it is done with cau-
tious regard for innocent life. There was no great national outcry outside the
already radicalized Pashtun areas against the commando action to remove
the terrorists from the Red Mosque, for example—despite a massive MMA in-
formation campaign to create one—because the operation was transparently
managed to demonstrate restraint, and every effort was made to protect the
lives of the innocent by the Pakistani government.
Pakistan’s cynical “catch and release” program, with its transparent pattern
of arrests of senior radical ªgures timed to coincide with high-level U.S. visits
to Islamabad (who are usually released shortly after as the U.S. airplane is off
the ground) demonstrates that Pakistan certainly knows where the ringleaders
are, and could arrest or kill many of them at will. It is the will, not the intelli-
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gence, which is lacking, and it is long past time for the U.S. government to
probe behind the assurances of friendship and alliance. Additional purging of
ISI elements with long-standing links to the Taliban and other extremist
groups will also be necessary. Only the Pakistanis can do this, however, and ul-
timately the long-term solution for Pakistan’s ills is more democracy, not more
U.S.-backed militarism.
While tough military operations to tamp down open rebellion are necessary
in the short term, like Afghanistan the FATA represents a long-term challenge
that will ultimately be solved only by massive rural development and educa-
tion programs. The paltry U.S. foreign aid commitment to the FATA of $75 mil-
lion a year, or less than $20 a year per FATA resident, while providing the
Pakistani Army with nearly $2 billion annually in military aid is, at best, a
gross distortion of priorities, and is absurdly inadequate to begin this process
in any case. Indeed, providing $2 billion a year in development aid to the
FATA and NWFP region and $75 million a year to the Pakistani Army would
go a lot further toward reducing anti-American jihadi fervor and improving
the national security of the United States than the inverse currently in effect.
But even with adequate resource levels, real rehabilitation of the Pashtun tribal
structures will be a long and deliberate process. It has to start with discussion
with the tribal leaders and moderate political parties of the region, not more
craven obeisance to the most radical religious elements in the MMA. In the
short term, this does mean a commitment to a strong Pakistani military pres-
ence in the FATA, including the willingness to see past the Indian bogeyman in
order to redeploy troops now on the Indian border, because there can be no
meaningful economic development or reassertion of traditional tribal forums
without continuous, reliable security. This will require more regular forces
with signiªcantly more training in counterinsurgency. U.S. intervention with
India, including diplomatic stimuli to pull India’s troops back from its side of
the border, would be helpful in this regard. The 2007 plan to provide U.S.
training and assistance to the tribal paramilitary Frontier Corps is misguided,
however. Since their inception a century ago, those units have always been
poachers-turned-wardens, with well-recognized limits on their reliability; and
today they are more deeply inªltrated and compromised by divided loyalties
than ever before.82 The Frontier Corps’ problems have little to do with weap-
ons and training, and U.S. troops recruited largely from the inner cities and
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trained for conventional warfare have little to teach rugged Pashtun hillmen
about ªghting in their own mountains in any case.
In the wake of the elections in Pakistan on February 18, 2008, the George W.
Bush administration continues to admire the emperor’s new clothes, issuing
statements increasingly at odds with Pakistani public opinion in regard to
President Musharraf’s future, but his days in office are clearly numbered.
Years of unconditional support and foreign policymaking based on personality
and wishful thinking have left this White House with few options. The elec-
tions, however, were a triumph for democracy in South Asia, and the ANP’s
victory in NWFP presents the next U.S. administration with a historic opportu-
nity to stabilize the frontier and begin to salvage the U.S. relationship with the
Pashtun people. The clear rejection of the fundamentalist religious parties in
favor of Pashtun nationalism has opened a window of opportunity for interna-
tional leaders willing to understand the border and its people.
The tribal structures of Pakistan and Afghanistan have been wounded, but
such an ancient culture cannot be eradicated in thirty years. However badly
the building blocks of that culture are damaged, there remains a foundation on
which Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other interested parties can begin to restore
traditional Pashtun power structures and mores. Whether the cultural under-
standing, diplomatic acumen, and political will to foster, support, and
underwrite such an endeavor exist in the United States and NATO remains to
be seen. Ultimately, the fate of the Pashtun tribal territories will prove to be the
greatest test of U.S. and NATO abilities. Should they fail, the consequences for
the Pashtun, Afghanistan, Pakistan—and the West—will be far worse than
anything previously endured.
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